Meeting with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is very much like visiting with your grandfather. He is warm and engaging. He lives in the history he did so much to write, speaking of events that happened 50 years ago with the same spark with which he speaks of the latest developments. His personal warmth, clear love for his people, and his dedication to our welfare have a way of clearing your mind of worry and fear. Sitting across from him, you cannot help but look at him and recall the footage from the Sinai in the Yom Kippur War -- Maj.-Gen. Ariel Sharon riding in an open jeep with a bloodied bandage on his head.

The atmosphere at his Jerusalem residence is serene. People are tranquil and smile at you. Even the security guards are calm. No one seemed worried about protecting his turf. The street leading up to the prime minister's house is quiet, no demonstrations. All you notice on your way to meet your leader is the Moment Cafe with its muted, transparent plaque at once memorializing the 12 people murdered while drinking coffee on a Saturday night and asking the public not to think about the massacre too much. Understatement, serenity or is it apathy? are the order of the day.

After three years of stormy government under Binyamin Netanyahu and another 18 months of total governmental breakdown under Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, national grandfather and national hero, is a soothing influence. He exudes confidence and a sense that he is comfortable wielding power. He walks in the footsteps of his mentor, David Ben-Gurion, the "Old Man."

And if the striking similarity between the white-haired leaders is not clear to his visitors, perched on the prime minister's bookshelf is a framed photograph of Sharon, the brilliant young paratroop commander and tactician of counterterrorism, conferring intimately with the Old Man himself. The photograph, nestled comfortably next to a photo of Sharon and his late wife, Lilly, together in a wheat field, seems right. It is not a vanity picture, you might say. It is no delusion of grandeur. It is there by right. Looking at Sharon in the flesh, sitting across the desk you think, he sits here, in the prime minister's chair, by right.

Sharon knows precisely what he wishes to say. He is not easily interrupted or swayed from his line. He explains, proudly and in great detail, how he envisions a phased settlement of the war with the Palestinians. It is all in the Palestinians' hands, he explains.

They need to destroy terrorism. They need to arrest terrorists, dismantle terror organizations, collect illegal arms and transfer them to American monitors to be destroyed. If they do this, and if they end incitement and reorganize their finances in a manner that ends corruption and siphoning off of funds to terror, we will be able to make a deal with them.

This plan, he explains, is a framework agreed upon with the Bush administration. The Americans agree, he says, that before anything else happens, the Palestinians must end terrorism and violence.

Last Friday night, we received a good indication of what will happen if the Palestinians don't do what Sharon demands. The IDF gave an ultimatum to the arch-terrorists under siege in the Mukata compound in Ramallah with Yasser Arafat, the godfather of all arch-terrorists. You must come out with your hands up in five minutes, they were ordered.

Hearing this, Tawfik Tirawi and Arafat had a good laugh. They had been there before, two years ago, when Ehud Barak gave them the same ultimatum on Yom Kippur. End terrorism in 24 hours, he ordered. But then, as now, there was something missing. There was no "or else."

The hollowness of the IDF's ultimatum, like Barak's, points to the strategic vacuum that Sharon has not filled. His plan for transforming the Palestinian Authority is missing the same vital ingredient. He has no "or else." What will happen if the Palestinians do not turn against one another and destroy their one achievement as a people terrorism? What will happen if there are no arrests, if they continue to attack us?

I asked Sharon repeatedly what he has taken from the Palestinians to make them decide to stand down. He pointed to their poverty. He intimated that they are now reaching the conclusion that force will get them nowhere.

Maybe this is true. But why is this new understanding any different from their supposed understanding in 1993, when they pledged before the entire world to forswear violence against us and combat Palestinians who refused to take the path to peace?

Sharon explains that under him things will be different. The Palestinians will be forced to fulfill their part of the bargain. Under the Sharon plan, US security forces will monitor the activities of the PA security services.

On the face of it, this seems reassuring. After all, the Americans are our friends. They agree that the PA must end terrorism. But if the Americans are so committed to the plan, why do they protest the IDF's actions against the terrorists being harbored in Arafat's compound? Why does President George W. Bush insist that we not harm Arafat? And why did US Ambassador Dan Kurtzer publicly attack Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on Wednesday, asking him acidly how the IDF's operations against Arafat's house guests advance the "Quartet's" plans to reform the PA?

After all, if the US is committed to truly reforming Palestinian leadership, it should be applauding the IDF's actions at the Mukata and encouraging the air force to drop a one-ton bomb on the building from a US-made F-16 in order to clear a path for those peaceful leaders who will not dare to speak up as long as the murderers remain in charge.

Sharon explains that given the world's refusal to accept the reality that the Palestinians are waging war against us, our ability to conduct continuous and decisive battles against our enemies is constrained. This is certainly true. But rather than making the case to the world that we are at war, Sharon accepts the notions of Peres and Kurtzer, the EU and the UN that there is no military solution to the war and that the end of the war will be to arrive where we started, at Oslo and Camp David, offering the PLO a state. He is there with them even as he quibbles about the final borders.

Sharon's innate leadership skills, his ability to make those around him trust that he will make things come out fine, mark him as a proper leader for a citizenry traumatized to the point of apathy by terrorism. His tactical brilliance has transformed the IDF from a military addicted to negotiations into a lean, mean fighting machine ready for action at a moment's notice.

But this is not enough. Sharon is leading this country at a transformational moment in our history and will not see the changes. After two years of war, after nine years of broken promises to fight terror by the Palestinians and by the US to supervise this, it is clear that the old strategy of land for peace was a delusion. We know today that the Palestinians will only stop fighting when they can no longer fight and only we can bring them to that point and ensure that they stay there. Reality has repudiated belief in land for peace.

The new paradigm, borne out by our monstrous experience on the ground, is "peace or else," and the time to act on the "or else" is now. But our new Old Man refuses to break with the past. Unless he breaks with the repudiated past, the best we can do is bask in Sharon's warmth until the time has come for us to move past our hero and toward a better future.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post.

Sharon: No military solution to the war with the Palestinians

In a comprehensive, exclusive interview with The Jerusalem Post, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon offers his perspective on the possibility that Israel is forced to respond to an attack by Iraq during a US-led campaign against Saddam Hussein's regime.

He also details his thoughts about the path to settling the war with the Palestinians and discusses his commitment to the national unity government.

Sharon, speaking at his official residence on Wednesday, also reveals the operational difficulties involved in fighting Palestinian terrorism.

What follows is the full text of the interview, preceded by some of the highlights of Sharon's remarks:
 

The full text:

Q: How do you respond to the statement by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in his testimony before the US Congress last week that if Israel is attacked during an American led attack on Iraq that it shouldn't respond?

Sharon: First of all, we support the US's moves. We have not interfered at all. We have not tried to speed up an action or to postpone one. We appreciate the importance of this operation. We will of course provide all assistance that we are called upon to provide, just as we did during the war in Afghanistan.

As to the subject itself, I hope that the US's mode of operation with its coalition partners will be such that a potential attack against Israel will be averted. If Iraq attacks Israel, but does not hit population centers or cause casualties, our interest will be to not make it hard on them. If on the other hand Israel is harmed, if we suffer casualties or if non-conventional weapons of mass destruction are used against us, then definitely Israel will take the proper actions to defend its citizens.

Q: Can you imagine a situation wherein which Israel responds with a counter-strike against Iraq even in the face of staunch opposition from the US?

Sharon: I don't think that is the situation that we are facing. I hope that the US, in its understanding of the situation here, will take all possible actions to prevent us from reaching that type of situation. Of course, Israeli citizens cannot be exposed to harm without Israel acting to defend its citizens. I believe that this point is clear in Washington. I made it clear during my conversations in Washington. I also believe that there is an full understanding of the need to act in a manner that will make it impossible to harm Israel.

Q: When Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir acceded to American pressure during the Gulf War and did not respond to Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, he was repaid by the US with a suspension of loan guarantees for aliyah absorption and as a result, lost power in the 1992 elections. Do you think that if in the coming US attack on Iraq, Israel accedes to US pressure and again restrains itself, that the US will respect us for our efforts on its behalf?

Sharon: I think that one of the US's lessons from the Gulf War is that it did not carry out the necessary steps during the war or it did not take enough steps to protect Israel or to prevent attacks on Israel.

Because they learned this lesson, I think that they will carry out the necessary operations to prevent a situation, where Israel will need to take action.

Q:Today we see a linkage between the gathering US attack against Iraq and the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Last week, while the UN Security Council was discussing possible action against Iraq, the Quartet met and discussed the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This week, the Security Council condemned Israel. Clearly, by publicly castigating Israel this week, the US administration is making it clear that it is having trouble denying the linkage between the ongoing war here and the need to operate against Iraq. Maybe Israel could be most helpful to the US by bringing the war to a swift and conclusive end before the US begins its operations in Iraq.

Sharon: I do not believe that there is any connection between the Palestinian problem and the need to deal with Iraq as a terror center and a center for the development of weapons of mass destruction. These are two completely separate issues. There is no connection between the two. What we have here is a cynical attempt by the Arab states and the Palestinians to put pressure on the US to take action against Israel. This is blackmail pure and simple. Arab states and the Palestinians are blackmailing the US but in reality there is no connection between the issues.

We see that there have been statements against or criticism against Israel by the US administration. It is important to put this criticism into perspective.

Even between good friends there are sometimes disagreements. We are linked to the US by a tradition of friendship and we have enjoyed an even closer friendship with the current administration. I have the greatest respect for the leadership of President George Bush and for his leadership of the war against international terrorism.

At the same time, I want to make clear: It is the duty of the Government of Israel to defend its citizens. We saw the terror attack on Tel-Aviv's main street. We saw the attack in Hebron, during the Succoth holiday as Jews were leaving prayers an attack on a family.

My policy has always been not to escalate and to act carefully. I see here a Palestinian intention to escalate the terror attacks before a possible US action in Iraq. Their operating assumption is that as the US operation against Iraq gets closer it will become more difficult for Israel to act against them because Israel will not want to make things difficult for the US administration.

A great deal of thought went into the operations in Ramallah [at Arafat's compound.] Our intention is to prevent the Palestinian Authority, which is involved in terrorism and the terror organizations it works with including the Palestinian security forces, from committing and escalating their attacks ahead of a possible attack against Iraq.

As to your question about ending the war completely, our policy is to prevent an escalation of terrorism and in fact to reduce it. In addition to daily or nightly actions, the policy will be to respond forcefully to any attempt to raise the level of terrorism.

Q: Is it possible for us to end this war?

Sharon: I have always acted to prevent escalation of the situation to progress, perhaps more slowly but in a manner that has provided us with freedom to act diplomatically in our struggle against terrorism. I think this has been the proper policy. I think the ideas that have been discussed here in Israel by politicians and others. Their advocacy of our going in and destroying terrorism is a wrong approach. If we had gone that route we wouldn't have been in the place we are today where we can fight terrorism.

Q: When you were a commander in the IDF, you always ensured that the forces you commanded advanced swiftly to bring the battles you commanded to a decisive conclusion. It appears that today, you have adopted a completely contradictory approach. Why is that?

Sharon: This is true. But this is the difference between a military commander and the Prime Minister.

Q: But what is the difference exactly? In both situations the fight was against a terrorist war. It's the same enemy.

Sharon: When you are a commander you have to concentrate you efforts. You have to see things in a much narrower context. You have a goal and you have to achieve it in the best possible way. As a prime minister, the responsibility you shoulder is much wider and you have to see the entire picture. You have to see the present, assess how things will develop in the future and therefore this gradual approach in my view is the proper one.

If I look a year and a half back, when we operated in Gaza, by Beit Hanoun and our forces went 300 meters into Area A, the move was greeted by international shock waves. That is not the situation today. Today we are in all of Area A, not because we want to be there but in order to prevent terror. We have no limitation on our military actions we choose the moves we think are most effective.

This did not happen by chance. It was a gradual process, through our military actions and our diplomatic moves and also because of world developments that made the dangers of terrorism clearer. I always have seen terrorism as a strategic threat. There were leaders in Israel that said that terror is not a strategic threat. I always disagreed with this.

I have always seen terrorism as a strategic threat, not a tactical threat. But here you have to see the wider picture. You have to understand that over three million Palestinians live here without the million Israeli Arabs.We don't want to return and sit forever in Jenin or Nablus or Ramallah.

Q: Is there no chance at victory here?

Sharon: There is a possibility from a military perspective, the ability to level hard blows, and we have done so. But we have to do it in a way where we get a place where we level a decisive blow to terror organizations.

But if we want to get a situation where we can conclude a diplomatic agreement, and I want to get to a diplomatic agreement, we have to achieve a situation where after we leave the areas there will be someone who will oversee things there.

Q:Can you see a situation where the people who supervise the areas are the same people conducting a terrorist war against the State of Israel?

Sharon: No absolutely not. I think that to a large extent that President Bush's plan, the principles of the plan, are acceptable to us. Not only are they acceptable, but we had great influence over the formation of the plan. The key to the proposed settlement is that it be conducted gradually. It is predicated on the understanding that there must be a complete cessation of terrorism and violence as a first stage.

Then there are actions that will be carried out as a function of the development of Israel's relations with the Palestinians. The final agreement or the final settlement is something we will achieve in a number of years to be determined not by an arbitrary deadline but rather by developments on the ground.

Generally speaking, this plan demands serious reform. Serious reform involves Arafat being removed from any position of influence. There has to be an intermediate level of prime minister or as I referred to it at the time "chief executive officer." There have to be governmental ministries that function properly.

One of these ministries is the Ministry of the Interior that will be in charge of the security organizations. The Palestinians need to replace their fourteen separate security/terror organizations with three new and different security organizations. What exists today has to be taken apart. They have to be subordinate to a commander who is not involved in terrorism.

Q:Is Abdel Razak Yihye involved in terrorism?

Sharon: No, I think not. To the best of my knowledge he is not stained by terrorism. Next to him there has to be a team, under US leadership a monitoring team that will monitor all of their activities.

Q: So are you talking about a US trusteeship? Do you mean that the Palestinians will be under a US mandate?

Sharon: No, no.

Q:So what are these monitors?

Sharon: Today the PA's forces are called security forces but all of them are involved in terrorism. We need someone who will supervise.

Q:Why shouldn't Israel be the monitor?

Sharon: I don't want to sit in Nablus forever. I do not want to have our country mobilized forever to sit in Nablus and Jenin and Ramallah.

Q: But why would we have to sit there forever? Why shouldn't we supervise them? Why should the Americans do it for us? Why would the Americans do it better than we would?

Sharon: How would you do it? You have to sit inside there and follow all their activities what are they doing, how are they training.

Q: Who could do that better than Israel? After all, the need to supervise them stems from the need to protect Israel's citizens. The protection of Israel's citizens is the responsibility of Israel's government not the US government. Why should the Americans do our job?

Sharon: We are responsible for our lives. And this is what we are doing. Therefore the solution that I suggested is a phased plan because every step we take is irreversible. We will stay in Jenin and Nablus for as long as it takes but I think it would be a mistake to stay there forever.

So I spoke about the security apparatuses, they have to be completely new ones, completely different ones.

The security reform is only one aspect of the plan I agreed to with the Americans. The PA's finances also have to be transformed. There has to be one address on the financial side. Arafat has to be completely cut off from all the finances. What we see now is a very small beginning of the process. Arafat still controls the financial apparatuses as he controls the security structures and the terrorist structures.

There is also the whole issue of the media and the incitement. The media's incitement is terrible unbridled. The education system also must be revamped.

What I just laid out are the general principles of the plan. These principles must be translated into clear action on the ground by a new Palestinian leadership. These actions include several components.

First, it needs to arrest all the terrorists from all the organizations, investigate them and try them.

Second, it needs to dismantle all the terror organizations Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Aksa Brigades, the Tanzim, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine all the organization must be dismantled. This is the reform as we agreed with the US. It is not by chance that I went to the US six times in one year. We set up joint teams who worked out all of these programs together.

Third, the Palestinians have to disarm and collect all the illegal weaponry in the areas and transfer them to a third party in my view the US in order to take them out of the area and destroy them.

Fourth, they have to engage in real operations to prevent terrorism. In the past when we gave them lists of people or information about terrorist cells about to carry out attacks. Rather than prevent the attacks the PA would warn the cell members to hide and so make it more difficult for us to find them. So we need serious preventative operations.

The fifth thing is an absolute end to incitement.

I would define these as very difficult conditions but absolutely necessary ones. If they are not met it will be impossible to advance in a diplomatic process. Israel will not agree, under any conditions to enter into a situation of an agreement, let alone a situation of purported peace if the terror continues. These are Israel's demands. These were all agreed upon between Israel and the Americans. And we stand by these demands.

Q: Do you think the Americans will stand by Israel in demanding the fulfillment of these conditions?

Sharon: It is quite possible that the US will see it as important to show that things are moving forward, maybe because of their current situation, but we took this issue of finding a phased solution very seriously because our lives are on the line.

Therefore it is our position, which I made clear to the Americans that we will not compromise on them. I made it clear that for a durable peace I am willing to make territorial concessions. I am not willing to make even the smallest concession when it comes to the security of the citizens of Israel or the security of the state. I said this from the first meeting, from the first day. I haven't moved from this position, not once.

Q:Aren't you making concessions regarding our security by not arresting Yassir Arafat, by leaving Ahmed Yassin free?

Sharon: I don't want to go into Yassin because I don't know what is going to happen with him so I don't want to go into it. We made a concerted effort in Gaza Monday night and had some great successes, we were able to get to key figures there.

As for Arafat, in my first meeting with President Bush they asked not to physically harm him. I promised not to cause him physical harm. My relations with the US and the White House, are based on credibility. In my view credibility is more important than agreeing or disagreeing with someone. In my view, this credibility has been an important foundation of the relationship that developed.

I promised not to cause him physical harm. From a military perspective, when we have to take out that group of murderers [in the Mukata] and they are the biggest terrorists that exist, to take them out we could have stormed in. The problem is that this sort of operation involves the possibility of physically harming Arafat. I committed myself to not harm him so I didn't order them in. The same is true with taking down the buildings there. We took down the buildings in the compound and left him in a little hovel. We took them down until we got to the point where any further action was liable to cause the structure he is in to fall on top of him. We will do everything we can to bring all these people with him to a fair trial.

Q: William Safire wrote this week in The New York Times that the time has come for you to choose between your unity government and victory in the war against Palestinian terrorism. How do you respond to him?

Sharon: There is no contradiction between the war on terrorism and the participation of all the parties in the government. I have not seen even one operation that was not carried out because of the unity government. For instance what is happening now in Ramallah is the result of a unanimous cabinet decision.

I have not heard statements by the Foreign Minister or the Defense Minister that point to a distinction in how we fight the war on terror. There are different approaches to the diplomatic plans but what concerns the war on terrorism, there is a consensus that we must fight terrorism and that you cannot reach a compromise with terrorism. I do not see any problem here.

I have always favored unity governments. I formed such a government with Peres in 1984 when we were in the midst of a terrible financial crisis. I did it for Shamir. I was a partner in the formation of every unity government that we have had. I place great importance in unity. It lowers the local hatreds and rivalries. It brings greater unity among world Jewry.

A unity government is something that the Arabs, including the Palestinians view as their principle weak point. If they succeeded in breaking up the unity government it would be a great accomplishment for them. Militarily, there is no operation I can think of that was prevented because of the unity government. No constraints have been placed on the army.

Q: Perhaps, but it seems that because of the unity government, Israel is not pursuing our enemy with anything approaching a winning strategy. Rather than initiate, all we seem to do is react for a couple of days after every new massacre, declare victory and withdraw until the next massacre.

Sharon: You need to understand, there is a difference between what I call operations in a time of peace and operations in an all out war. It isn't that we are not at war. We are at war. But the general sense of the world is that we are at peace. Operations and activities that you take during an atmosphere of peace are more limited. What you can do today, you might not be able to do tomorrow.

The name of the game is readiness and willingness to take action immediately on the same day, straight away when you have the opportunity. That's one of the things that the military has achieved today. There have been a lot of shortcuts. After the Pessah attack at the Park Hotel the army responded immediately. After Hebron this week the IDF went into Gaza. After Tel-Aviv last week we went into Ramallah, on the same day. Our army and security forces have undergone a serious transformation in the past year and a half on these issues. In a substantial way, it was my contribution stemming from the way I commanded when I was in the army. I deal a lot with the issue of formulating how we can be prepared to act immediately.

But the notion, brought up generally by self-proclaimed experts that we can go in and end it in one fell swoop is wrong. In that case, we could only go in once. This way, we can go in any time we need to.

Q: Yes, but to what end? If the Palestinians know, that no matter what they do, all we'll do is go in and then leave, then they know that they can fight this terrorist war against us and at the end of the day they lose no ground. We'll give them back all the ground they forced us through arms to take. Why should they ever stop fighting?

Sharon: They have lost a great deal. What did Arafat give them? He brought them total economic destruction. He brought terrible poverty and suffering. He brought great rifts in Palestinian society. What accomplishments has he brought them?

Q: You, Mr. Prime Minister, in the midst of war say in a clear voice that we will not stay in Nablus, we will give it back to them. So maybe we don't want to be in Nablus. But have we annexed the Jordan Valley? We want to retain the Jordan Valley. But we still haven't shown them that they have lost the Jordan Valley. We still say we'll discuss it. Why haven't you annexed the Jordan Valley? Have you allowed Jews to pray on the Temple Mount? You haven't allowed Jews to pray on the Temple Mount. So what have they lost?

Sharon: The damage incurred by the Palestinians is terrible. Today we see the beginnings of a thought process among them that it is impossible under any circumstance to break Israel. This was their great hope. Israel wasn't broken. Our volunteering spirit is phenomenal. Our society is fine whereas Arab society is at the beginning of a breakdown. There is no longer hope that they can break Israel by force. Everything that has happened for them is just damage.

Israel, in her agreements will insist on security zones. I've already presented this. All of Israel's governments decided not to annex the Jordan Valley outside of an agreement.

Q: But we are at war now because our partner for an agreement decided to explode women and children. So what is stopping us?

Sharon: Our partner has conducted a terrorist war against Israel for more than 120 years. First under the Turkish rule, then harsh campaigns were launched against us during the British Mandate 1921, 1929, 1933, 1936-1939. All these years there was terror. Then of course when the UN decided on the partition plan on November 29, 1947, the same day they started a war. This terror war is a strategic war. It is quite possible that if we hadn't had this terror war, that after the Declaration of Independence, the Arab Salvation Army and all the armies of the Arab states would not have invaded. The terror brought all of the wars.

Q: Let's touch for a moment on the wall being built today along the Green line. Why is it being built?

Sharon: The fence isn't a diplomatic border and it isn't a security border. The fence is another means to make it difficult for terrorists to penetrate and to make it easier for us to combat terrorism. That's the point of the fence. If you see the area of Wadi Ara, we need a fence there. That's where most of the terrorist attacks come from and without a physical barrier around Umm el Fahm it is very hard to prevent those infiltrations.

Q: If the wall is a tactical means of fighting terrorism can you foresee a situation where Israel tears down the wall? As in after we finish the job on terror?

Sharon: There are those with a slogan about how they know how to rout out terrorism.

Q: "Who supports routing out terror!?" I recall someone standing on a stage in 1990 and rousing the crowd with a statement to that effect. [At the Likud Central Committee meeting in 1990, in a challenge to Yitzhak Shamir's party leadership Ariel Sharon took the microphone and began repeating the mantra, "Who supports routing out terror?]

Sharon: That was me. I support routing out terrorism and all my life I have fought against terror and I continue today. But it is not something that we can fight and destroy quickly. It takes time. It demands commitment and hard work and a lot of thoughtfulness, and this is important so that we will be able to continue fighting.

Q: If we go for a minute to the North. Is the diversion of the Wazzani River away from the Hatzbani River a casus belli?

Sharon: It has always been Israel's water policy to prevent harm to our water sources. This means that any move to change the status quo of water arrangements by our neighbors must be agreed upon by both sides. Nothing can happen without our agreement. The Hatzbani river is one of the three water sources of the Jordan river.

Arab states back in the 1960s tried to divert the water sources from the Jordan. This precipitated Israeli actions against these attempts to divert the water. These actions by the Arabs actually were what brought about the deterioration of the security situation that precipitated the Six Day War. Although our struggle on this issue began on November 3, 1964, the situation from then until the outbreak of the Six Day War was one of constant deterioration of the security situation. Israel prevented the diversion of water away from it. From Israel's perspective it is a question of life and death. There is a wall-to-wall consensus on this matter. We will absolutely ensure that no water is taken from us.

Q: Yes, but they are doing it. Everyday there are pictures in the paper of the pipes they are installing on the Wazzani. These are huge pipes. It is being carried out.

Sharon: The thing about those pipes they are using now is that their size shows that the entire operation is aimed at taking water from Israel. They are taking this water to an area very close to the Litani River when the water from the Litani flows into the Mediterranean.

The fact that they aren't using existing water sources, in close proximity to the area where they plan to use the Wazzani waters shows that the whole intent here is to take the water from Israel. The same was true with their diversion project in 1964. They weren't planning to use the water back then either. The plan was to go around Israel and to divert the water to the Yarmouk River where it would then flow down to the Dead Sea. That was their plan. Today's situation is very similar. Therefore we have made it absolutely clear that Israel will not allow them to take the water from us.

Today they are not pumping the water. They are today pumping water in small pipes for local use, as is their right.

Q: The claim has been made that because of the trauma that you went through personally during the Lebanon War the calls "Sharon is a murderer" and the Kahane Commission that you will not take action in Lebanon. How do you respond to these claims?

Sharon: I have no trauma from Lebanon. I think that the war in Lebanon was a war of salvation. I think that if it hadn't been for the attempt, in the middle of the war, to take down the government, we would have accomplished things that we were prevented from accomplishing.

I also think that the American position then was a mistaken position. In all of my conversations with them during that period I presented the possibility of creating the triangle of Jerusalem, Cairo, Beirut as a triangle in the region with a democratic, western orientation. I viewed this as important. But the Americans ended up among the forces that prevented Lebanon then from reaching an agreement with Israel. I believe they were wrong then.

I have no trauma. I think it was one of our most justified wars and I say this as someone who fought in all of Israel's wars. There are people who have no responsibilities. When someone holds no responsibility what's to stop him from saying anything he wants to?

As to what is happening today on the Northern border, we see the axis of Iran, Syria, Hizbullah. We see visits by Iranian officers. We see the involvement of Iran in Syria something that we didn't see until the reign of the current Syrian president Bashar Assad. We see his admiration for the leader of the Hizbullah. We see the forces being built up there. We know these people and we are ready to deal with them. The main force there is the Syrians.

Without the Syrians the Hizbullah wouldn't be able to do anything they wouldn't be able to transfer weapons, which now Syria is also providing. Iran couldn't provide weapons to Hizbullah without Syria. We see the presence of the Iranian revolutionary guard forces in areas of Lebanon under direct Syrian occupation since January 1976. So we believe that Syria is principally responsible for everything that happens there.

At the same time, we are not interested in fighting there. As long as it is possible through diplomacy to bring deterrence we need to do so. At the same time, if damage is done to Israel we will deal with this problem. Syria bears the brunt of the responsibility. But if there is damage done to Israel, the ones who will be harmed by it, even if we wish it weren't so, will be the Lebanese and Lebanon itself. There will not be a situation where Northern Israel is attacked and they continue on in peace in Lebanon. As long as we can contain them and deter them through American mediation, we will do so. We don't want to get entangled in war but we are ready to fight.

Q: And if they go through with their plan to divert the waters from the Hatzbani what will happen?

Sharon: Israel will not allow the Hatzbani to be diverted. I want to be very clear on this. And we are ready to deal with this.

Q: From the picture you paint of Israel unable to end the Palestinian terror war and of the high risks we are exposed to in the North, it is hard to look at the coming year with optimism.

Sharon: That is not the way to look at things. We've always had terror, at the same time, we have achieved great things here. We brought in millions of Jews from 102 countries. We have an industrial infrastructure that is among the most developed in the war. Israel today constitutes one of the four most interesting centers for high tech in the world. Our research institutions are some of the best known. We have good music. Our agriculture is among the most advanced in the world. What haven't we accomplished here? We are a world leader in biotechnology research. We have had great achievements in medicine. The problem is that because of the war and blood, Israel is known as a country at war. But we have had great accomplishments.

When I look at the situation I am optimistic. In the government's plans our first priority to increase aliyah. We view this as our goal to bring another million Jews here in the next 10-13 years.

Q: How do you see yourself as advancing aliyah when the government's budget calls for canceling the right of new immigrants to a tax exemption on income from abroad? All the immigrant groups, both here and abroad have explained to you that this will hinder aliyah from Western countries. It will make Jews less likely to come here and perhaps force Jews already here to leave How does this fit in with your plans?

Sharon: It's possible that there is a problem here or there. We are dealing with these issues. Right now we are concentrating on encouraging aliyah from Argentina and Uruguay because of the financial situation there and from France because of the rise in anti-Semitism. Today I see thousands making aliyah from Argentina. I see Jews from France buying apartments here. In our view there are a million potential olim from the Former Soviet Union.

Q: Are they Jews?

Sharon: They are Jews by definition of the Law of Return. I wish you had seen, two days ago I hosted 80 soldiers in my succah. They were absolutely Israeli. They came from all the units in the IDF from some of the most prestigious commando units, and there were officers among them. They are all from families without a Jewish mother. And they are now undergoing conversion. To see the way they spoke, their spirit, and respect and patriotism and feeling of right for the land of Israel, believe me, from an occasion like that you come out with a sense of security.

I will not allow any change to be made in the Law of return. For as long as I'm here there will be no change. I support doing everything we need to do to speed up conversion processes. I'm talking about the volume. I will not allow under any circumstance to deport the mother of a soldier after he finishes his service. I read about such a situation in the paper and I prevented it from happening and now we've introduced legislation in the Knesset to ensure that such situations do not occur in the future.

Q: What about aliyah from the United States?

Sharon: We have the largest reserve of Jews in America and I want to tell you that there is aliyah from America but not enough. In all my appearances before American Jews I talk mainly about aliyah. But our thought today is to try to take care of aliyah of Jews who aren't wealthy. This is the most important thing in my view. It is important from a demographic perspective although the fear of our losing our Jewish majority here strike me as a bit strange.

When I hear sometimes the Foreign Minister talking about us becoming a minority here, I don't know what he is talking about. We never offered Arab residents of Judea and Samaria to become citizens of Israel. Even those who will stay in the areas will retain after a settlement will be Palestinian citizens not Israeli citizens. This is clear.

My government also wants to reach a diplomatic agreement. And we're working on this. I've met with people even here, in my residence not Arafat. It won't be easy. I read you the conditions the Palestinians must meet. And they aren't easy. They are hard. But one thing must be clear, they must abide by agreements. In the past we didn't make them live up to their agreements. That's over.

Economically we have difficulties, but not just us. But I believe if we abide by the budgetary constraints we have set for ourselves including not going above our three percent deficit target that we will be okay.

Israel has a lot of problems and needs to manage its war properly from a military perspective and I think we are handling it properly. From the diplomatic perspective we need to know how to stand strong on the issues that are important. The Jews have one little country albeit a country with a lot of talent. But only one country and it is the only country where Jews have the right and the strength to defend themselves on their own. This is something that we will never concede because it is our duty to fulfill.

Q: What do you see as the task of World Jewry?

Sharon: There's no doubt that world Jewry and especially US Jewry has to see its responsibility for what is happening here. Not that they can intervene on everything and of course they also are not carrying the full weight of defending this country. But they need to know that what happens here will directly impact the lives of Jews in other places in the world. If Israel, God forbid is weakened, Diaspora Jews will not be able to continue living their lives the way they do today. We saw this. So it is the responsibility of World Jewry to stand with Israel and give us the support and the backing because this also impacts the lives of the Diaspora Jews themselves.

Q:Do you ask them for anything concrete?

Sharon: I think it's important for me to tell you what I expect from the Jews in the Diaspora. First off, I expect Jews to make aliyah. That's the main thing. If Jews want to help out then they should make aliyah. They should send their children to study here. They should come for extended visits. They should come and volunteer. But aliyah is the main thing. My call is for aliyah. Of course to have aliyah they need to be educated. We need Jewish education for world Jewry. Aliyah is the main thing.

They should also of course come and visit here. There they just see the pictures, but life is more or less normal here. Tourism to Israel is also a way to help. They should invest in Israel.

The central role of Jews, and Israel does most of the work in this field although good work is also being done in America is to work against anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is growing and spreading like wildfire throughout Europe. Here the Jewish organizations need to stand at the helm of this struggle.

So first, my hope for World Jewry is that they come here on aliyah. They must understand the dependence of Jewish life in other countries on the situation in Israel. And finally, they should fight anti-Semitism.

I want to tell World Jewry that there is no need for despair. Holding the sword in one hand and the ploughshare in the other, Israel has achieved great things already and the future lays before us. I wish all of the House of Israel a hag sameach and Shana Tova.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post.

MKs Yossi Sarid and Ofir Pines-Paz are huffing-and-puffing mad. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has just committed the most cardinal of sins. He has appointed a man overtly supportive of the prime minister to head the Mossad.

"This is a dangerous precedent," Pines-Paz huffs.

"This should be a professional, not a political appointment," Sarid puffs.

Fighting words. The charge that the prime minister might sacrifice the security of the nation by placing a political hack without professional qualifications into one of the country's most important security jobs is a weighty and serious one and bears careful examination.

First things first, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Meir Dagan, a 32-year veteran of the IDF, has proven himself both as a field commander and as an intelligence officer. He has distinguished himself in every position he has filled by dint of his professionalism, independent thinking, and bravery.

In fact, insofar as his professional qualifications for the job are concerned, there is no question that the Mossad can only stand to benefit from having Meir Dagan as its leader.

The controversy is due to the fact that as a private citizen, he worked overtly for the election of Ariel Sharon in 2000.

This, according to Sarid and Pines-Paz, is the reason that he must be rejected as head of the Mossad.

But then the question arises, in his capacity as a retired general turned private citizen and campaign advisor, did Dagan do or say anything that might have upset the separation between the political and military leadership of this country?

In a pre-election interview with him in December 2000, I tried to force the issue. At that time, the Barak government was refusing to hold the Palestinian Authority and Yasser Arafat responsible for the carnage wrought by Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad forces. The week I met with Dagan, Barak's team was breathlessly negotiating with Arafat's emissaries at Taba in a last-ditch attempt to forge an agreement before the elections.

I asked him if he thought there is a military solution to the conflict. My question was loaded because at the time, the Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip's slogan, "Let the IDF win," was all the rage. That slogan called into question the government's right to prevent the army from taking steps that could torpedo its political goals.

Dagan refused to take my bait.

He carefully explained to me that the security services must, under all circumstances, follow the directives of the political leadership. In his words, "The military conducts discussions with the political leadership. In these meetings, the strategic aims of the political leadership are made clear. All operational plans of the IDF will reflect the policies of the government. The army, with the means at its disposal, can advance whatever strategic goals the government may have."

While stipulating the army's absolute subordination to the political leadership, as a private citizen, at that early stage of the war, Dagan mapped out what he believed was the best strategy for emerging victorious.

"In order to safeguard its interests vis-a-vis the Palestinians, Israel must engage in four areas simultaneously. It must use military force against infrastructure targets, including physical targeting of all those involved in carrying out violent attacks against us. The PA itself must not be immune. Israel must damage the interests of the PA as an authority and also cause harm to the personal interests of the leaders of the PA for instance by ending their extraordinary privileges as VIPs and their personal control over the granting of work permits and permits to transfer goods through checkpoints.

"Friendly foreign governments, including key Arab states, must be used to exert political pressure on Arafat to force him to put an end to the violence, at the same time as Israel threatens to take away the strategic gains he has accrued through the Oslo process. It must be made clear that Area A is not sacred. If the IDF can go to Entebbe to save Jews, it can certainly go to Beit Jala.

"Finally a barrier must be lodged between the PA and the Palestinian people. Israel can do this by enabling continued employment of non-violent Palestinians in Israel, while at the same time publicizing the facts of the PA leadership's rampant corruption to their people."

As for the character of an eventual agreement with the Palestinians at the end of the war, Dagan favored "the creation of a dynamic of long-term interim agreements, at the end of which Israel will retain control of all strategic areas."

All of this, of course, is in line with the plans carried out and still envisioned by the prime minister. That is, Dagan, aside from being a soldier's soldier, is strategically aligned with the goals of his boss.

This may very well be the real problem that Sarid and Pines-Paz have with Dagan's appointment. To see this, one needs to recall the untenable situation that former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu suffered with the "professional" heads of his security services when he entered office.
Upon assuming the premiership in June 1996, he was greeted by the scowling faces of the Shin Bet's Ami Ayalon and the Mossad's Danny Yatom. In a widely criticized move, Shimon Peres had appointed the two just months before the general elections.

Neither Ayalon, a OC Navy, nor Yatom, as military secretary to Rabin and Peres, had an ounce of intelligence background between them. In spite of this, the media and Sarid embraced both as worthy "professional" appointments.

While neither publicly campaigned for Peres, their public records since have shown they share a left-wing ideological perspective that made them patently hostile to Netanyahu and his right-wing government.

Their lack of professional experience as well as their personal hostility toward the elected government contributed to their later professional blunders and their public insubordination to the democratically elected government.

Ayalon made headlines when he publicly repudiated Netanyahu in the aftermath of the PA's military offensive against the IDF in September 1996, following the government's decision to open an entrance to an ancient tunnel alongside the Western Wall. As it was later made clear, Ayalon had repeatedly presented the prime minister with the incorrect assessment that the opening would not lead to violence.

Ayalon first lied about this having been the case, and then backtracked when it was proved incontrovertibly that he had not warned the prime minister. Far from accepting the consequences of his incompetence and later duplicity by resigning, in a display of shocking insubordination, Ayalon appeared before the television cameras at the Knesset, and sanctimoniously insisted that he would not resign because, "like the song says, I have no other land." (The song, as well known to Israelis as "Danny Boy" to Irishmen is a song of political protest against a country that has lost its moral compass).

Exactly one year later, Yatom oversaw the Mossad's bungled assassination attempt of Hamas chief Khaled Mashaal in Amman. Here too, Yatom initially lied and said that he had opposed the operation when in fact it had been his idea. The Keystone Kops-inspired Mossad fiasco caused long-term security damage to the state. To secure the release of the two Mossad agents and reconstitute relations with Jordan, the government was forced to release Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin from prison.

Both of these incidents at the very least suggested that, contrary to the media's assumptions, neither Yatom nor Ayalon were professionally competent.

Furthermore, their public betrayals of the country's elected leadership showed conclusively that they did not share Meir Dagan's view that under all circumstances, the security services of this country must be subordinate to the political leadership.

After leaving his post, Yatom emerged as Ehud Barak's chief of staff for security and diplomacy. In this capacity, he wrongly convinced the prime minister that Syria's Hafez Assad would sign a peace treaty in March 1999 and that Arafat would sign a final deal at Camp David in July 2000.

Since entering civilian life, Ayalon has backed IDF reservists who refuse to serve in the war, has referred to Israel as an "apartheid state," and most recently signed a "peace agreement" with Sari Nusseibeh, the PLO's point man in Jerusalem, in which he agreed that Israel should hand over sovereignty of the Temple Mount and the Jordan Valley to the PLO and that Israelis living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be removed from their homes.

There can be no question that Yatom and Ayalon have a right to their beliefs and loyalties. There can also be no doubt that their beliefs and loyalties made it impossible for them properly to perform their functions as "apolitical" security chiefs in Netanyahu's government.

In appointing Dagan to lead the Mossad, Ariel Sharon is setting a welcome precedent. In the amorphous world of intelligence, where one needs to make assessments based on imperfect information, the intuition and instincts of a service chief become crucial components of the conclusions drawn. An individual's intuition and instincts are informed not only by his professional expertise but also by his ideological world-view and values.

Dagan's world-view places him at the center of the national consensus today. His values will ensure that under no circumstance will he become confused about the subordinate role that the security services play vis-a-vis the elected leadership in our democracy.

No wonder Sarid and Pines-Paz are so mad.

Originally published in the Jerusalem Post

On Wednesday, the IDF carried out a successful operation in damage control.

By spiriting Intissar and Kifah Ajouri into the Gaza Strip at Netzarim rather than having them pass through at the Erez checkpoint, where the international press corps was waiting to photograph the first targets of the government's new policy of punishing relatives of terrorists, the IDF prevented a media onslaught. For as Ms. Ajouri, the explosive-belt seamstress from Nablus, later told a sympathetic cameraman in Gaza, she had planned to cause a ruckus at the checkpoint.

The IDF's operation was an unvarnished success. The only problem is that it is meaningless. Clamping down on terrorism, we are told, the government has ordered the IDF to go after terrorists' families.

But, as the High Court of Justice rightly judged, the two were not sent to Gaza for a two-year stay because they are the siblings of a Fatah bomber dispatcher. They were sent to Gaza because they are themselves terrorists. Why sending the two to Gaza is more effective in fighting terrorism than trying them in court for aiding and abetting terrorism and sentencing them to prolonged prison terms for their crimes is a mystery.

Indeed, an even larger mystery is why the IDF is not told to round up, charge, and try all the thousands upon thousands of Palestinians who, like the Ajouri siblings, aid and abet terrorism.

A visit with the forces in the northern Gaza Strip provides an opportunity to observe firsthand just how smart and effective a fighting force the IDF is. Every day the IDF foils terror attacks, catching terrorists who hide like needles in haystacks or attack like thieves in the night. The precision of IDF operations is impressive. From April to August, the IDF killed 141 terrorists in Gaza and, aside from its hit on Salah Shehadeh, has killed only eight civilians.

At the headquarters of the northern brigade, senior officers show visiting journalists videotapes of recent battles between soldiers and terrorists. In one, shot from the deck of a ship, the camera bobs with the waves. The movie was taken with night-vision equipment at 3 a. m. Because of the undulating camera lens, it takes a moment to focus on the action taking place on the shore.

Two dots are Palestinian terrorists. The flashes emanating from the dots are shots at IDF forces. The Palestinians, who swam more than a kilometer to reach the shore near Dugit, wound two soldiers -- two more dots. The soldiers kill one terrorist, but the second keeps shooting away until a new dot emerges. It is the soldiers' commander. In an act of heart-stopping heroism, the commander, whose ammunition had run out, runs directly into the terrorist and fights him hand to hand until he kills him.

In many respects, the IDF's actions in Gaza call to mind the trench warfare of World War I. Topographically, there are no commanding heights in the sand dunes of the Gaza Strip. The terrorists try to break through the lines, and the IDF pushes them back. The terrorists cannot penetrate the IDF's encampments, so they try to lure the IDF into ambushes or pick off soldiers on the roads.

The Palestinian military strategy does not involve military victory. Rather, like Hizbullah, they seek simply to cause enough casualties to exhaust Israel, while leaving the bulk of their terrorist infrastructure intact.

The security situation on the ground in Gaza is daunting. From the beginning of April until the end of August, the Palestinians carried out 1,452 attacks against IDF and civilian targets: 682 shootings, 320 grenade attacks, 284 mortar attacks, 52 anti-tank missile attacks, 23 rocket attacks, 47 attempted infiltrations, five of which were successful, 64 roadside bombs, and three booby-trapped vehicles. But in all these attacks the terrorists caused no civilian casualties.

Their lack of success has not deterred the terror groups. "They are constantly working to change their tactics. Today, for instance, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and a new terror organization are working hard on developing capabilities for underwater attacks," a senior officer in Gaza explains.

And the terror groups are not alone. They receive training, munitions, and financing from Hizbullah and Iran. Hamas, which developed the Kassam mortar and the Banaa anti-tank missile, is supported and assisted by the Palestinian Authority.

While the IDF's killing of Hamas commander Salah Shehadeh was a harsh blow to the group's command structure, the IDF knows that Muhammad Deif, Shehadeh's successor, is working around the clock to carry out a successful mega-attack.

Standing at a ridge outside at an observation tower by Nisanit, I am struck by the strategic importance of the much-maligned settlements. They are quite simply Israel's forward defense. Located just a few kilometers from Gaza City and directly across the street from the Green Line, Nisanit, Elei Sinai, and Dugit are all that separate Gaza City from Yad Mordechai and Ashkelon, whose power plant, belching smoke into the sky just 12 kilometers away, is plain to see.

To secure military and civilian traffic on the exposed roads, the IDF decided to strengthen fortifications. In addition to the electronic fences around each settlement, the army is now constructing a new fence that will encompass the brigade headquarters, Nisanit, Elei Sinai, Dugit, and the roads connecting them. Lt. Malik Grifat was killed on Thursday while securing construction of the new fence.

An officer carefully explains, "The new fence is being constructed wholly in the area left under Israeli control by the Oslo Accords."

"Why?" I ask him.

"Because eventually we'll go back to the way things were," he says knowingly.

"But then why should the Palestinians stop fighting if they are losing nothing?"

"Heh, you're asking a political question," he shies away.

His statement blends with the words of the senior officer: "We didn't go into Gaza during Operation Defensive Shield, because it was decided to leave the PA intact in Gaza to see if it is capable of fighting terror."

Since the government decided to transfer security power back to Yasser Arafat's forces in Gaza and Bethlehem, the IDF redeployed from certain areas it was holding in the Gaza Strip and has allowed the PA's forces to operate more or less freely in them. Now back in the driver's seat, those Palestinian forces have done next to nothing to combat terrorism.

"While the Palestinians have stopped some terrorists en route to attacks, they have taken no active role in thwarting terrorism. They have conducted no raids or arrests," the senior officer dryly notes.

In the meantime, over the past two weeks, there have been seven attempted infiltrations, a series of booby-trap attacks, daily shooting incidents, repeated mortar attacks on homes in Gush Katif, and a half dozen anti-tank missiles fired.

In addition to transferring territory back to PA security control, the IDF has taken actions to ease the economic suffering of Gazans. "We have issued 7,000 work permits to Gazans and hope to issue more shortly," the officer proclaims proudly.

But rather than distributing the work permits directly to the Palestinians, a move that would show them that Israel rewards those who do not participate in terrorism, in accordance with the government's policy of maintaining the PA, the IDF gives the permits to the PA, whose officials are responsible for divvying them out.

One comes away from a visit to Gaza with an enduring respect for the army and an overriding sense of frustration with the government that issues its marching orders.

Quite simply, the IDF's forces can be likened to firefighters battling an arson in a multi-story building, who are told by headquarters to only put out the fire on the top floor, while at the same time providing the arsonists with more kerosene.

The IDF's orders are plain: Fight and sustain the PA. The fact that these orders are contradictory to the point of absurdity -- rendering all of the IDF's good work a pointless, Sisyphean task -- is completely beside the point.

And just as certainly as that metaphoric building will eventually burn to the ground, the PA is winning its war. It has proven it can breach all its signed commitments, wage a war, and lose nothing at all. When the IDF carefully builds its new fence outside land given to Arafat in exchange for peace, the Palestinians are made to understand that there is absolutely no price to pay for conducting their war -- in fact they are rewarded. They can and do attack with impunity, and the government sustains them, while loudly proclaiming to the public that it is so serious about fighting terror that it is moving to the draconian step of punishing relatives of terrorists.

And really, as to those relatives, one must ask, what lesson is being learned as a result of the Ajouri siblings' temporary relocation to Gaza? If tomorrow a Palestinian terrorist comes home and tells his sister that he is planning an attack, what will she do? If she tells Israel, she faces certain murder as a collaborator. If she helps him, there is 99 percent certainty that nothing will happen to her and but a 1 percent chance that she will have to move to Gaza for a couple of years. There, she knows, she will be supported by the PA or Hamas or some international human rights organization that views her presence in Gaza as an Israeli war crime.

As for the army -- it has proven that it can do anything the government tells it to do. The problem is, the government is telling the IDF to minimize casualties as it loses the war in accordance with the government's wishes.

Originally published in The Jerusalem Post